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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines income-smoothing by Japanese firms using several reserve accounts. Previous 
studies investigated the incentives for Japanese managers to smooth income using sales of assets, 
discretionary accounting accruals or depreciation charges under different operating environments. 
Discretion in reserve accounts as a means of income-smoothing, however, has not yet been 
investigated. Understanding Japanese managers’ earnings management via reserve accounts is 
particularly interesting because of the unique legal environment for reserve accounts. We find that 
income-smoothing via reserve accounts is associated with size, tax, capital intensity, operating 
deviations, leverage, earnings variability, and securities offerings. When we partition the sample to 
take into account the substantial structural changes in Japan in 1990, the effects of several variables 
appear to be different over the two periods. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
apanese laws and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) mandate various reserve accounts. 
One unexpected result of this requirement is to increase management opportunities for income-smoothing. 
Managers do this in order to maintain target income levels, to avoid the violation of debt covenants or to 
avoid political costs, etc. Prior studies have examined several means of earnings management in the U.S. and Japan, 
such as asset sales (Bartov 1993; Poitras et al. 2002; Herrmann et al. 2003), loan loss provisions (Kanagaretnam et al. 
2003; Kanagaretnam et al. 2004), discretionary accounting accruals (Jones 1991; Wu 1997; Teoh et al. 1998), or 
depreciation charges in different operating environments (Herrmann et al. 1996). Reserve accounts represent another 
important means for income-smoothing, but one that has not well been understood. Japanese laws and GAAP allow 
managers to create and use various reserve accounts, and also give considerable discretion in the treatment of these 
accounts. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether Japanese managers, when faced with certain incentives, use 
reserve accounts to smooth income. Various reserve accounts are unique to Japanese financial statements. Under 
Japanese law, firms have been required, from April 20
th
, 1982, to set up reserves for their guaranteed obligations 
(Takahashi et al. 1984). These reserve accounts, however, can be used as a means for smoothing earnings because 
rules on reserve accounts are loose and require managerial judgment. Corporate accounting principles and tax laws in 
Japan do not provide detailed guidelines for computing reserve accounts. Also, within the rules, there is flexibility in 
determining reserves for a given year. Japanese managers, therefore, may be faced with more opportunities to use 
reserve accounts to smooth income than their counterparts in the U.S.  
 
These reserve accounts are large enough to materially affect the financial statements. Sony Corporation’s 
reserve accounts in 1990, for example, totaled 34,113 million Yen, equivalent to 5 percent of retained earnings. The 
Japanese Commercial Code also requires firms to reserve an amount equal to at least 10 percent of cash dividends until 
the accumulated reserve becomes 25 percent of the capital stock. Despite the clear importance of reserve accounts in 
financial statements, no prior study has examined whether managers use them to smooth income. This paper, in 
examining Japanese firms that have more managerial discretion in reserve accounts, looks at important factors known 
to be related to income-smoothing, and attempts to determine whether Japanese managers use reserve accounts to 
J 
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smooth income. The paper will, therefore, provide useful information to investors, regulators, and other users of 
financial statement in their future decision-making. 
 
The next section presents background on earnings management, and the economic and legal environment in 
Japan during the sample period. The third section describes research methodology and data collection procedures; the 
fourth section reports the results of our empirical analyses and discusses additional analysis. The paper concludes with 
a summary of our findings and suggestions for future research. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The potential for Japanese managers to smooth income using accounting discretion in reserve accounts is 
greater than in other major industrialized countries, mainly because so much discretion is permitted in reserve 
accounting procedures. In particular, reserve accounts can be used as a primary means of income-smoothing because 
of their complexity and the management discretion available. Firms use various types of reserve accounts, including 
reserves for loan losses, corporate taxes, business taxes, bonuses, special reserves, legal reserves, capital reserves, and 
earned reserve accounts, amongst others.  
 
Several U.S. studies have examined factors related to earnings management. Moses (1987), for example, uses 
specific firm characteristics that may provide incentives for managers to make accounting choices that smooth 
earnings. His results show that income-smoothing is associated with firm size, the existence of bonus compensation 
plans, and variations in earnings. Jones (1991) tests whether an import relief assessment by the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) is associated with discretionary accruals; she reports that managers decrease earnings through 
discretionary accruals during import relief investigations. Dechow and Sloan (1991) investigate whether firms use 
discretionary cash flows to improve short-term earnings performance when CEOs are in their final years in office; 
their results suggest that these CEOs spend less on research and development. 
 
Maydew (1997) tests empirically whether corporate income tax induces earnings management by firms with 
net operating losses; he finds that firms manage their earnings by disaggregating shifted income into recurring and 
non-recurring revenue and expense components. Dechow et al. (1995) find that a firm’s financial performance affects 
managers’ incentives for earnings management. Kasznik (1999) also finds that firms with earnings falling below 
management forecasts have more positive discretionary accruals in that year than in other years. These studies provide 
empirical evidence of earnings management in the U.S. context. 
 
 Several studies have examined factors that affect Japanese managers’ incentives for earnings management. 
Herrmann and Inoue (1996) empirically tested income-smoothing using changes in depreciation methods. They find 
that, under certain operating conditions, firm size, income taxes, capital intensity, deviations from expected operating 
activities, and earnings variability are all related to income-smoothing via changes in depreciation method. Herrmann 
et al. (2003) use income from the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities to test Japanese managers’ earnings 
management. They find that income from sales of assets and management forecast error have a negative relationship, 
after controlling for debt-to-equity ratio, firm size, growth, and last year’s income from asset sales. Darrough et al. 
(1998) examine choices in accounting accruals, and find that the capital structure of Japanese firms is associated with 
earnings management only after the 1990 market crash. They also find that, regardless of their unique business 
environment (such as long-term orientation and tax-aligned accounting practices), Japanese managers choose 
accounting accruals that increase income, in order to increase bonuses and augment outside funding.  
 
While reserve accounts are subject to considerable management discretion, their use as a means of 
income-smoothing has not been well understood, or, indeed, examined at all. In particular, the unique Japanese legal 
and accounting environments for reserve accounts give stakeholders powerful motivation to examine whether these 
reserve accounts can be used for income-smoothing. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Income-Smoothing Measures 
 
Assuming a random walk expectation of earnings (E) and earnings before provisions on reserve accounts 
(EBR), a measure of income-smoothing (IS) is calculated by comparing the absolute value of the one year difference in 
earnings before provisions on reserve accounts (CEBR) with the absolute value of the one year difference in earnings 
(CE). Firms with negative CEBR are likely to have a greater incentive to smooth income using reserve accounts, in 
order to lower the difference between the two EBRs. Similarly to discretionary accruals models (see, for example, 
Dechow et al. 1995), this measure is scaled by the beginning-of-year total assets (ASSETS) to control for the effect of 
firm size, as presented in model (1). 
 
IS it = 
1
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 (1) 
 
where 
IS = a proxy of income-smoothing; 
EBR = earnings before provisions on reserve accounts; 
E = net income; and 
ASSETS = beginning-of-year total assets. 
 
A similar model is also used by Moses (1987) and Herrmann and Inoue (1996) in measuring 
income-smoothing. Positive values of IS represent income-smoothing, as the absolute values for CEBR are used to 
lower the absolute values of CE. 
 
Factors Related To Income-Smoothing 
 
 We here discuss variables identified in prior studies as affecting managers’ incentives for income-smoothing. 
We examine whether income-smoothing using reserve accounts is also associated with these factors. 
 
Firm Size 
 
Large firms have high public profiles, and so have greater incentive to maintain their reputations (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that large firms have greater incentives to disclose financial 
information accurately to avoid litigation. Fluctuations of income in large firms draw more attention from investors 
and/or creditors, increase litigation risk and may attract the attention of regulators (Benston and Krasney 1978). 
Consistent with this, Lee and Mande (2003) find a negative association between absolute discretionary accruals and 
size. Thus, larger firms may have less incentive to smooth earnings. Therefore, a negative association between firm 
size and income-smoothing is expected. Firm size (LNSIZE) is measured by the natural log of total assets. 
 
Taxes 
 
Tax laws are influenced by political, social and economic objectives (Ali and Hwang 2000). Tax reporting 
should provide managers with incentives to reduce taxes by reporting systematically low profits (Choi and Mueller 
1992); this is particularly true under a progressive tax system. It is therefore expected that firms with greater current 
tax liabilities are more likely to smooth income under Japan’s progressive tax system. In order to examine the tax 
incentives on income-smoothing, current year income tax expenses are deflated by sales (TAX). 
 
Capital Intensity 
 
The proportion of fixed assets to total assets represents capital intensity. Firms with large investments in 
facilities and equipment are less likely to smooth income, because these accounts should have less accounting 
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flexibility under historical cost accounting principles. Herrmann and Inoue (1996) find, however, that firms with large 
fixed assets are more likely to smooth earnings using changes in depreciation method. Therefore, to examine the effect 
of capital intensity on income-smoothing, net tangible fixed assets deflated by total assets (INTEN) are included. The 
sign of this variable is an empirical question. 
 
Operating Activity Deviation 
 
Managers may have greater motivation to smooth income if actual operating results deviate from expected 
operating results. Japanese firms tend to focus on sales growth as their main goal (Radebaugh and Gray 1997), and so 
sales are used to measure deviation in operating activities. The deviation is measured as the absolute value of the 
change in sales deflated by prior year sales (DEV), and is expected to have a positive association with 
income-smoothing. 
 
Earnings Variability 
 
Daley et al. (1988) find that variability in earnings increases firm risk and therefore increases cost of capital. 
If this is the case, managers who have experienced high variability in earnings have greater incentive to smooth 
income, in order to lower the cost of capital. A positive association is therefore expected between income-smoothing 
and past earnings variability. Earnings variability (EVAR) is measured as the absolute value of the change in earnings 
divided by sales averaged over the last three years, including the current year. 
 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
 
U.S. studies find that leverage is positively associated with management incentive for earnings management 
(Bowen et al. 1981; Dhaliwal et al. 1982; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Public ownership is, however, less prevalent 
in Japan than in the U.S. (Black and White 2003). Also, Japanese firms depend more on bank debt and banks are, at the 
same time, some of the largest shareholders. Banks therefore closely monitor firms’ accounting practices, and firms 
find it more difficult to smooth income. It is an empirical question as to whether and how the debt-to-equity ratio 
(DTEQU) is associated with income-smoothing in Japan. 
 
Return on Assets 
 
Kim et al. (2003) and Heflin et al. (2002) find that profitable firms are less likely to use income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. On the other hand, firms with large profits may want to smooth earnings so that they can show 
continued future growth (Libby and Kinney 2000). The direction of the effect from a firm’s profitability, therefore, is 
an empirical question. Return on assets (ROA) is used to measure profitability, calculated as the ratio of net income to 
total assets averaged over the last three years, including the current year. 
 
Changes in Depreciation Expenses 
 
Depreciation expenses can be used as a means for smoothing earnings (Moses 1987). Firms smoothing 
earnings using depreciation expenses are also likely to use reserve accounts for additional income-smoothing. In order 
to examine whether there is an association between depreciation expenses and income-smoothing, we include changes 
in depreciation expenses over one year deflated by the previous year’s sales (CGDEP). 
 
Stock Issuance 
 
Managers have more incentive to smooth income prior to securities offerings (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 
1998); stock issuance, therefore, is expected to be positively associated with income-smoothing. Stock issuance is 
measured as stock issuance in the following year deflated by current year total assets (ISSUE). 
 
 In order to examine the association between the variables discussed above and income-smoothing, the 
following regression model is used: 
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IS it = 0 it + 1 LNSIZE it + 2 TAX it + 3 INTEN it + 4 DEV it + 5 EVAR it + 6 DTEQU it  
 
+ 7 ROA it + 8 CGDEP it + 9 ISSUE it +  kitkk INDUSTRY +  litll YEAR +  it 
 
Data Collection And Descriptive Statistics 
 
Following Takahashi (1984), our sample period consists of firm-years from 1982 through 1999 in the 
PACAP and OSIRIS databases for Japan. A total of 27,061 non-financial and non-regulated firm-years are available 
between 1982 and 1999. Financial and regulated firms are excluded due to their non-homogeneous business 
environment and firm characteristics. We then exclude firms which do not have a March 31st fiscal year-end, to 
control for the information environment (leaving 19,534 firm-years). Excluding firm-years without the necessary 
financial data for the regression model leaves 19,029 firm-years. Table 1 presents the number of observations of 
reserve accounts by industry and year. The sample firms represent a wide range of industries, with about 25 percent 
coming from Chemicals and Electric Machinery.  
 
RESULTS AND ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression are presented in Table 2. The table shows that 
the median value of tax expenses accounts for about 1.5 percent of sales, while the mean value of fixed assets accounts 
for about 22 percent of total assets.  To eliminate potential effects from outliers, the top and bottom 1 percent of 
continuous variables are winsorized.  Using unwinsorized values does not change our conclusions on any of the 
variables, but lowers statistical significance for some of the variables. The Pearson correlation matrix (not reported) 
shows that there are generally no large correlations between the independent variables used in our regression analyses.  
The largest correlation is between ROA and DTEQU ( = -35.86).  Eliminating one of these variables does not affect 
our conclusions (in fact, it improves the statistical significance of other variables). 
 
Table 3 provides results of our main regression using the full sample. The adjusted R
2
 of the regression is 
0.2347. Firm size (LNSIZE) is significant and negatively associated with income-smoothing at the one percent level. 
Consistent with findings in previous U.S. studies, large firms in Japan have less incentive to smooth earnings. Capital 
intensity (INTEN) is also negatively associated with income-smoothing, which is consistent with our conjecture that 
capital-intense firms are less likely to smooth income, possibly because of reduced flexibility in the valuation of fixed 
assets under historical cost accounting principles. The debt-to-equity ratio (DTEQU) is negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that debt-holders closely monitor accounting practices, thus preventing 
managers from income-smoothing behavior. 
 
Income tax expense (TAX) is positive and significant at the one percent level, consistent with our conjecture 
that managers with large tax liabilities are more likely to smooth earnings to minimize tax expenses under the Japanese 
progressive tax system. Deviations in operating activity (DEV) and changes in depreciation expenses (CGDEP) are 
positive and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that managers are more likely to smooth earnings when 
actual operating results deviate from expected results, and when depreciation expenses increase. Also, earnings 
variability (EVAR) is positive and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that managers experiencing high 
variability in earnings are more likely to smooth earnings, possibly to reduce the cost of capital. Moses (1987) also 
argues that more fluctuations in earnings may result in higher borrowing rates or lower stock returns and, therefore, 
increase management incentive to smooth earnings. Finally, ISSUE is positive and significant at the one percent level, 
suggesting that managers who plan to issue equity stock are more likely to smooth earnings, in order to maximize the 
success of equity offerings. Neither the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) nor the Condition Index (CI) indicate serious 
multi-collinearity problems (highest VIF = 2.1, highest CI = 28.3). 
 
Table 4 presents smoothing behavior according to operating conditions. Profitable firms whose CEBR is 
either positive or negative are presented according to the sign of income-smoothing. Overall, the number of 
income-smoothing firms (i.e., IS > 0, N=13,105) is more than three times the number of non-income-smoothing firms 
(i.e., IS  0, N=3,605). Firms experiencing losses are also presented in separate columns according to the sign of IS. 
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The number of income-smoothing loss-making firms (N=1,342) is around 1.4 times that of the respective 
non-income-smoothing firms (N=977). The Chi-Square tests are performed to check the equal frequency of operating 
conditions for the profit and loss groups, respectively. For the profit group, 76.6 percent of positive CEBR firms are 
classified in the income-smoothing group, while around 80.3 percent of negative CEBR firms are classified in the 
income-smoothing group. For the profit group, the significant Chi-Square value is 33.87 (significant at the one percent 
level), indicating that income-smoothing via reserve accounts is different according to operating conditions. This 
finding is consistent with our expectation that negative CEBR firms are more likely to smooth income via reserve 
accounts than positive CEBR firms. Of the 564 firm-years with positive CEBR and losses, 52.0 percent of them are 
classified in the income-smoothing group. On the other hand, 59.8 percent of firm-years with negative CEBR and 
losses belong to the income-smoothing group. The Chi-square value is 10.71 (significant at the one percent level), 
indicating that firms with negative CEBR and losses are more likely to smooth income via reserve accounts than firms 
with positive CEBR and losses. 
 
Table 5 presents four regression results under four different operating conditions. Consistent with our 
expectations, the overall significance of the model in the profit group is larger for the group with negative CEBR than 
with a positive CEBR (Adj-R
2
 = 0.3552 for negative CEBR group vs. Adj-R
2 
= 0.1500 for positive CEBR group).  
LNSIZE, TAX, INTEN, and DEV have larger coefficients and are statistically more significant than in model (B), Table 
5.  Models (A) and (B) in Table 5 show that deviations in operating activities (DEV) are important only for negative 
CEBR firms, but profitability (ROA) is an important motivation in income-smoothing only for positive CEBR firms.  
 
 Similarly, for the loss-making group (models C and D), the overall significance of the models is larger for the 
negative CEBR group than that with positive CEBR (Adj-R
2
 = 0.4057 for negative CEBR group vs. Adj-R
2 
= 0.2014 
for positive CEBR group).  Also, ISSUE is of particular interest in both profit and loss groups: the results of models (B) 
and (D) suggest that firms close to a securities offering are very likely to smooth income via reserve accounts, and 
much more so for firms experiencing negative CEBR than firms experiencing positive CEBR.  These results on ISSUE 
suggest that managers have strong capital markets-induced incentives for income-smoothing via reserve accounts, 
particularly when they have greater flexibility in reserve account treatment. 
 
Additional Analysis 
 
Japan experienced a market crash in 1990, and equity values dropped by more than half after the bursting of 
the bubble. It is therefore likely that there are differences in economic structure before and after 1990 (Darrough et al. 
1998). Sample firm-years are divided into two groups: the pre-1990 sample includes firm-years from 1982 to 1989, the 
post-1990 sample includes firm-years from 1992 through 1999. 1990 and 1991 are eliminated because they are 
transition years in the structural change. Table 6 reports the results of this comparison.  
 
The overall significance of the models is greater for the pre-1990 period than the post-1990 period (Adj-R
2
 = 
0.3085 for the pre-1990 group vs. Adj-R
2 
= 0.1452 for the post-1990 group). This may suggest that managers have 
experienced more difficulty in using reserve accounts for income-smoothing since 1990, possibly due to tighter 
regulatory and investor control over managers’ accounting practices. All variable signs are consistent across the two 
periods, and are also consistent with those reported in the full sample regression. While LNSIZE, INTEN, DEV, EVAR, 
CGDEP and ISSUE are significant in both periods, several variables are significant only in one period. Table 6, model 
(A), shows that the debt-to-equity ratio (DTEQU) and profitability (ROA) are significant only pre-1990. 
Highly-levered firms are less likely to smooth income, suggesting that debt-holders monitor managers closely in 
Japan, discouraging income-smoothing. ROA is positive and significant at the one percent level in model (A), 
suggesting that firms with profits may want to smooth their earnings in order to demonstrate continuous earnings 
growth. Table 6, model B, shows that tax expenses (TAX) are significant only post-1990, suggesting that, since 1990, 
tax was a primary incentive for income-smoothing via reserve accounts.  
 
The absolute values of the coefficients for LNSIZE, DTEQU, ROA, CGDEP, and ISSUE are greater and more 
significant during the pre-1990 period, while the absolute values of the coefficients for INTEN, DEV, and EVAR are 
greater and more significant for the post-1990 period. We examine the statistical differences in coefficients between 
the two periods using pooled regression with year interactions. The significances of incremental effects of each 
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variable are reported in the last column of Table 6. All variables except INTEN and DEV are significantly different 
between the two periods. Overall, the results suggest that income-smoothing behavior has changed between the two 
periods, possibly because of the structural changes in Japanese economy and their business environment. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Ali and Hwang (2000) suggest that bank-oriented financial systems, the heavy involvement of private sector 
bodies in setting standards, and employing loose accounting standards in Japan may lower the value relevance of 
accounting information. The availability of more opportunities for income-smoothing would be one of the reasons for 
the low content of accounting information, relative to other developed countries. In particular, unlike other developed 
countries, Japanese firms use complex and numerous reserve accounts. 
 
 This study provides evidence that Japanese managers smooth income using reserve accounts. In particular, 
we find that income-smoothing is significantly associated with firm size, tax expenses, capital intensity, deviations 
from operating expectations, earnings variability, leverage, depreciation expenses and equity offerings. This study 
also finds that income-smoothing differs significantly according to operating conditions. Firms with a negative CEBR 
have greater incentive for income-smoothing than those with positive CEBR, regardless of the current year’s profit or 
loss. For profitable firms with negative CEBR, all variables used in the regression except ROA are significantly 
associated with income-smoothing. For loss-making firms with negative CEBR, only LNSIZE, EVAR, ROA, and 
ISSUE are significant, suggesting that loss-making firms may have limited flexibility in smoothing income using 
reserve accounts, or may have fewer factors affecting incentives for income-smoothing. 
 
 Several limitations are acknowledged.  Firstly, it is possible that firms use reserve accounts for strategic 
reasons, rather than as a means of income-smoothing.  We were not able to control for firms’ strategic reasons for 
reserve accounts, due to the lack of firm-specific long-term business information.  Secondly, reserve provisions may 
be caused by changes in macro-economic factors other than the stock market crash of 1990.  We therefore suggest that 
the effects of other macro-economic factors on income-smoothing should be investigated in detail in future research. 
Regardless of these limitations, our study contributes to the literature by providing the first evidence of 
income-smoothing using reserve accounts.  The results of this study would be useful to multi-national investors 
considering investment into foreign countries, suggesting to enhancing their understanding of the unique accounting 
environment when interpreting financial statements. 
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution by Industry and Year 
Number of Percent of Number of Percent of
Industry Firms Sample Year Firms Sample
Fishery 85           0.45 1982 662         3.48
Mining 108         0.57 1983 676         3.55
Construction 1,904      10.01 1984 698         3.67
Foods 966         5.08 1985 720         3.78
Textiles 709         3.73 1986 782         4.11
Pulp and Paper 371         1.95 1987 915         4.81
Chemicals 2,235      11.75 1988 1,041      5.47
Petroleum 152         0.80 1989 1,101      5.79
Rubber 208         1.09 1990 1,125      5.91
Glass and Ceramics 490         2.58 1991 1,154      6.06
Iron and Steel 633         3.33 1992 1,200      6.31
Nonferrous Metals 555         2.92 1993 1,232      6.47
Metal Products 528         2.77 1994 1,267      6.66
Machinery 1,910      10.04 1995 1,276      6.71
Electric Machinery 2,550      13.40 1996 1,298      6.82
Transportation Equipment 1,682      8.84 1997 1,304      6.85
Precision Equipment 452         2.38 1998 1,297      6.82
Other Manufacturing 602         3.16 1999 1,281      6.73
Wholesale 1,387      7.29 Totals 19,029    100.00
Retail 516         2.71
Real Estate 323         1.70
Service 663         3.48
Totals 19,029    100.00  
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
N = 19,029 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
IS 0.0283 0.0597 -0.0333 0.0002 0.0085 0.0288 0.3779
LNSIZE 11.1370 1.3184 8.1662 10.2279 10.9822 11.9644 14.8458
TAX 0.0212 0.0240 -0.0080 0.0042 0.0148 0.0294 0.1315
INTEN 0.2416 0.1341 0.0134 0.1459 0.2260 0.3232 0.7508
DEV 0.0911 0.0863 0.0013 0.0308 0.0667 0.1228 0.4807
EVAR 0.0505 0.0858 0.0008 0.0105 0.0224 0.0500 0.5845
DTEQU 3.1788 4.4400 0.1342 0.9212 1.7499 3.4326 30.2523
ROA 0.0169 0.0240 -0.0728 0.0062 0.0160 0.0296 0.0894
CGDEP -0.0008 0.0106 -0.0516 -0.0015 0.0001 0.0025 0.0301
ISSUE 0.0392 0.1381 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.9472  
 
Variable definitions: 
IS = income-smoothing as defined in model (1); 
LNSIZE = log of total assets (in million of Yen) as of fiscal year-end;  
TAX = income tax divided by sales; 
INTEN = net fixed assets divided by total assets; 
DEV = deviation in operating activities measured as
1
1 ||
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; 
EVAR = earnings variability measured as 
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
0
2 1
1 ||
3
1
t t
tt
SALES
EE
; 
DTEQU = total debt-to-equity ratio; 
ROA = mean value of return on assets over the last 3 years including the current year; 
CGDEP = changes in depreciation expense deflated by prior year sales; and 
ISSUE = amount of stock issuance in the following year divided by current year total assets. 
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Table 3 
Regression Results – Full Sample 
 
IS it = 0 it + 1 LNSIZE it + 2 TAX it + 3 INTEN it + 4 DEV it + 5 EVAR it + 6 DTEQU it  
+ 7 ROA it + 8 CGDEP it + 9 ISSUE it +  kitkk INDUSTRY +  litll YEAR +  it 
 
Variable
Expected
Sign
Estimated
Coefficients t-value
Intercept +/- 0.0944       20.47***
LNSIZE - -0.0033     -10.76***
TAX + 0.1481         6.48***
INTEN +/- -0.0225        -6.13***
DEV + 0.0277         5.71***
EVAR + 0.0839       16.70***
DTEQU +/- -0.0009        -8.52***
ROA +/- 0.0197         0.83
CGDEP + 0.3872         7.62***
ISSUE + 0.1440       49.23***
F-value for Model    125.15***
Adjusted R
2
0.2347
N 19,029  
 
Notes:  
t-value is based on a two-tailed test for variables without expected signs. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. To keep the presentation brief, coefficient estimates for the 17 industry dummy variables and 21 year 
dummy variables are not presented. 
See TABLE 2 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Table 4 
Smoothing Behavior by Operating Condition 
Positive CEBR Negative CEBR Positive CEBR Negative CEBR Total
Income Smoothing   6,579(76.6%)    6,526(80.3%)   293(52.0%)    1,049(59.8%) 14,447(75.9%)
Non-Income Smoothing   2,007(23.4%)    1,598(19.7%)   271(48.0%)       706(40.2%)   4,582(24.1%)
Total   8,586(100.0%)   8,124(100.0%)   564(100.0%)   1,755(100.0%) 19,029(100.0%)
Profit & Loss &
 
Notes:  
Computed Chi-Square statistic equals 33.87 for the profit group and 10.71 for the loss group. 
Critical Chi-Square Value with degree of freedom 2 at one percent equals 9.210. 
Note: CEBR is the difference between actual income before provision on reserve accounts (i.e., EBR t) and expected income before 
provision on reserve accounts (i.e., EBR t-1). 
Income (non-income) smoothing represents firm-years with positive (negative) IS. 
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Table 5 
Regression Results by Operating Conditions 
 
IS it = 0 it + 1 LNSIZE it + 2 TAX it + 3 INTEN it + 4 DEV it + 5 EVAR it + 6 DTEQU it  
+ 7 ROA it + 8 CGDEP it + 9 ISSUE it +  kitkk INDUSTRY +  litll YEAR +  it 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Profit & (+) CEBR Profit & (-) CEBR Loss & (+) CEBR Loss & (-) CEBR
Estimated
Coefficients
Estimated
Coefficients
Estimated
Coefficients
Estimated
Coefficients
Variables (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
Intercept 0.1085 0.0961 -0.0109 0.0066
    (15.77)***     (13.92)***         (-0.25)           (0.52)
LNSIZE -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0002 -0.0014
    (-7.65)***     (-8.28)***         (-0.07)         (-1.75)*
TAX 0.0760 0.1323 -0.1233 0.1157
     (2.18)**      (3.84)***         (-0.16)          (0.80)
INTEN -0.0174 -0.0277 -0.0677 -0.0120
     (-3.16)***      (-5.02)***         (-2.47)**          (-1.34)
DEV 0.0046 0.0496 0.1075 0.0049
(0.60)      (6.97)***      (3.10)***           (0.43)
EVAR 0.0946 0.0805 0.2022 0.0395
    (11.55)***      (9.04)***      (7.00)***      (4.40)***
DTEQU -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0008 0.0002
     (-6.98)***     (-5.86)***         (-1.91)*          (1.47)
ROA 0.1752 -0.0558 -0.2737 -0.2140
     (4.23)***          (-1.24)         (-1.77)*      (-4.60)***
CGDEP 0.6169 0.2903 0.3622 0.0709
     (7.70)***      (3.75)***          (1.16)          (0.66)
ISSUE 0.0684 0.1598 0.2796 0.4044
    (12.37)***     (45.70)***          (1.36)     (30.46)***
F-value (Model)    33.23***    96.20***    4.09***    26.48***
Adjusted R
2
0.1500 0.3552 0.2014 0.4057
N 8,586 8,124 564 1,755  
 
Notes:  
t-value is based on a two-tailed test. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. To keep the 
presentation brief, coefficient estimates for the 17 industry dummy variables and 21 year dummy variables are not presented. 
CEBR = 1 itit EBREBR . 
See TABLE 2 for all other variable definitions. 
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Table 6 
Regression Results by Pre and Post-1990 Periods 
(A) (B)
Pre-1990 Post-1990 H0:
Estimated
Coefficients
Estimated
Coefficients Pre = Post
Variables (t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
Intercept 0.1030 0.0590
    (12.37)***     (11.09)***
LNSIZE -0.0050 -0.0020
    (-8.80)***     (-5.38)***    (-4.65)***
TAX 0.0219 0.1658
(0.51)      (5.82)***    (-3.32)***
INTEN -0.0264 -0.0270
     (-3.53)***      (-6.31)***       (1.48)
DEV 0.0227 0.0269
     (2.72)***      (4.32)***      (-0.29)
EVAR 0.0273 0.0968
    (2.40)**     (17.35)***    (-5.37)***
DTEQU -0.0012 -0.0000
     (-6.90)***          (-0.36)     (-6.57)***
ROA 0.2409 -0.0163
     (4.87)***          (-0.59)     (5.07)***
CGDEP 1.1174 0.1458
     (9.02)***      (2.70)***     (8.11)***
ISSUE 0.1734 0.1032
    (37.91)***     (25.37)***     (11.76)***
F-value (Model)    80.52***    47.62***
Adjusted R2 0.3085 0.1452
N 6,595 10,155  
 
Notes:  
t-value is based on a two-tailed test. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. To keep the 
presentation brief, coefficient estimates for the industry dummy variables and year dummy variables are not presented. Pre-1990 
period includes years from 1982-1989 while post-1990 period includes years from 1992-1999. 
See TABLE 2 for all other variable definitions. 
